

Bureaucracy and Bribery

A Conceptual Framework

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Public bureaucracies carry a potential for bribery. This paper tries to identify and examine the factors affecting the potential or the probability of bribery. It is argued that the specific nature and the probability of bribery depend on the persons involved, the corrupt act in question, the organization in which the event takes place and finally the socio-cultural, economic and political environment within which the organization operates.

Introduction

Corruption, which can be broadly defined as the misuse of public office, seems to exist in all societies in one form or another, albeit to different degrees. Although there are significant obstacles in undertaking empirical research¹, with respect to finding facts, proving these facts and publicizing them, the lack of a conceptual framework, on which to base empirical research, has made the systematic study of the subject even more difficult.

In this article an attempt will be made to develop a conceptual framework for bribery, which is a specific but common form of corruption². Bribery involves the

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¹As one author points out corruption “is not a subject which can be investigated openly by means of questionnaires and interviews.” See McMullan, M. “A Theory of Corruption.” *Sociological Review* 9 (July 1961): 181–201 (at p.183). Although committee reports or trial records may be used as data, they only constitute corrupt practices which are “exposed”. Moreover, statistical data should be evaluated carefully. For example, increase in complaints, investigations, prosecutions, departmental proceedings, and punishments may mean more intensified fight against corruption than any increase in it. See, for example, Hager, Michael L. “Bureaucratic Corruption in India: Legal Control of Maladministration.” *Comparative Political Studies* 6 (July 1973): 197–219.

²Some other forms of corruption are embezzlement, nepotism, patronage, and spoils.

misuse of public office for personal or private material benefits³. In a sense, bribery is an *exchange* between two parties⁴. One party, the briber, offers illegal inducements or rewards, such as money or gifts, in order to manipulate the decision or the judgment of a public official in the direction of his own interest. The public official, in return, acts in accordance with the demand of the briber, who provides the benefit⁵.

For a decision or a process to be subject to bribery, it should have an “economic value” for the “potential client”. For instance, if individuals or firms are required to obtain certificates, permits, licenses and the like to engage in and promote an economic activity, the decision of the related public office gains an economic value for the client⁶. Similarly, decisions pertaining to the purchase of goods and services by public organizations afford an economic value to the seller⁷. Also, if the demand for public services such as health and education exceeds the supply, the allocation or the distribution decision of the official(s) involved gains an economic value due to excess client demand and inadequate public service supply⁸. Since it is practically impossible to program all such decisions, *i.e.* regulate each and every case or situation by general and abstract rules, it becomes inevitable and necessary to delegate authority and discretion to certain levels in the bureaucracy. As discussed above, the decisions of the offices and officials can become a sought-after resource and can gain economic value for clients and thus the possibility of an illegal exchange between the two parties emerges⁹. In this sense it can be argued that bureaucracies carry a

³See, for example, Bayley, David H. “The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation. *Western Political Quarterly* 12 (December 1966): 719–732; Caiden, Naomi. “Shortchanging the Public.” *Public Administration Review* 39 (May/June 1979): 294–298; Friedrich, Carl J. “Political Pathology.” *Political Quarterly* 37 (January/March 1966): 70–85; and Nye, Joseph S. “Corruption and Political Development: A Cost–Benefit Analysis.” *American Political Science Review* 61 (June 1967): 417–427.

⁴Alatas, S. Hussein. *The Sociology of Corruption: The Nature, Functions, Causes and Prevention of Corruption*, Donald Moore Press, Singapore, 1968, 13.

⁵Although corruption can be regarded as a phenomena peculiar not only to public organizations and officials, and is therefore, relevant for private organizations as well, nevertheless in the academia corruption and bribery are generally understood to include only the former situation. See, for example, Heidenheimer Arnold J. (ed). *Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis*, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1970: 3–18.

⁶Beenstock, Michael. “Corruption and Development.” *World Development* 7 (January 1979): 15–24.

⁷Rose-Ackerman, Susan. “The Economics of Corruption.” *Journal of Public Economics* 4/1975: 187–203.

⁸Tilman, Robert o. “Emergence of Black-Market Bureaucracy: Administration, Development and Corruption in the New States.” *Public Administration Review* 28 (September/October 1968): 432–444. See also, Waterbury, John. “Corruption, Political Stability and Development: Comparative Evidence from Egypt and Morocco.” *Government and Opposition* 11 (December 1976): 426–445.

⁹Banfield, Edward C. “Corruption as a Feature of Government Organization.’ *Journal of Law and*

potential for bribery and that bribe-giving and bribe-taking are always possibilities in the public administration process¹⁰.

Within the above context, the basic issue becomes the identification of factors that affect, *i.e.*, increase or decrease, the probability of bribery. In this study, four major factors have been identified and examined. These factors are related to

1. individuals (briber and official),
2. the corrupt act or decision,
3. the organization (where the bribery takes place) and
4. the environment (within which the organization exists and the individuals operate).

It should be noted that although these factors are discussed separately, they are interrelated. For instance individual factors affecting the probability of bribery also depend on the organizational and environmental factors. For example, someone who may be personally inclined to engage in corruption may not actually do so in an organization where such practices can be easily discovered. Therefore the proposals or statements formulated and developed for each group of the above factors should be regarded in their own framework.

Factors related to Individuals

The main actors in bribery are the briber and the bribe-taker. In the final analysis, the decisions to give a bribe and to take a bribe are made by individuals. In reaching a decision to engage in corruption, individuals are influenced both by their personal characteristics such as their values, expectations and ambitions, and by their perceptions of such factors as the risk involved, the possibility of getting caught and

Economics 18 (December 1975): 591–605. Dowse, Robert. "Conceptualizing Corruption." *Government and Opposition* 12 (December 1977): 244–254.

¹⁰A distinction between political and administrative corruption can be made. Public office embodies public authority and power which are exercised by political policy-making institutions and by bureaucratic policy-implementing structures. In other words, authority is exercised by elected officials (politicians) and by appointed officials (bureaucrats), who perform policy-making and policy-implementing functions respectively. The misuse of public office and authority in the formulation of policies, for instance laws, can be regarded as political corruption, and the misuse of public office and authority in the implementation of these policies, for instance enforcement of laws, can be regarded as administrative corruption. Although it is not always easy to distinguish political and administrative corruption, it may be said that, in the former the politicians and in the latter the bureaucrats are the main actors. In this article, the focus is on administrative corruption, that is to say corruption in the process of implementing public policies and rules by the bureaucracy.

the effectiveness of control mechanisms. For instance, an official who thinks that he is underpaid or who has high expectations might be prone to corruption. On the other hand if he perceives the risk involved as high, the probability of corruption will decrease. In other words, individuals have different values and perceptions and hence under similar conditions they may make different risk and gain calculations and thus different decisions with regards to bribery.

Factors Related to the Bribe-Taker

It can be said that in the final analysis the public official's decision to take a bribe depends on the cost–benefit analysis of the corrupt practice¹¹. Costs of bribery — assuming the official gets caught and convicted — are: prison sentence and fine, earnings lost while in prison, dismissal from civil service, lost pension rights and other privileges, loss of status, friends and community standing, and later, difficulties in finding a respectable job. Benefits of bribery — assuming the official is not caught — are basically material gains such as money, property, commodities and other goods and services.

However, the calculation of costs and benefits and especially the risk of getting caught, differs from person to person. For instance, an official close to retirement may refrain from bribery. An employee facing financial problems may value the benefits of bribery more than someone else. A newly appointed official will probably wait to learn about the organization, its control mechanisms and the people in it before engaging in a corrupt act. A public official who has an ethical conception of public office and strong moral values may not even reach the point of making a cost–benefit comparison.

Considering the above, the factors related to the official which affect the probability of his accepting a bribe are:

- a) The official's values and norms
- b) The official's calculation of the risk involved
- c) The relative importance of the benefits to the official
- d) The official's position and tenure in the organization and in public service.

¹¹Shackleton, J.R. "Corruption: An Essay in Economic Analysis. *Political Quarterly* 49 (January/March 1978): 25–37.

Factors Related to the Briber

From the point of view of the briber the cost of bribery — assuming he gets caught and convicted — are: prison sentence and fine, earnings lost while in prison, loss of the material reward given as a bribe, loss of status, friends and community, and later, difficulties in regaining prestige in the business community. Benefits of bribery — assuming the briber is not caught — consist basically of the gain or the value of the illegal advantage conferred. As in the case of bribe-takers, bribe-givers may also calculate the cost and benefits differently. For instance, obtaining a contract may be more vital for one firm than others, and hence it may be ready to pay higher bribes and to assume greater risks.

Considering the above, the main factors related to the briber which affect the probability of bribery are:

- a) His values and norms
- b) The relative importance of benefits to be gained
- c) His financial situation
- d) His calculation of the risk involved.

In conclusion, individuals, within the parameters of the above subfactors, calculate costs and benefits, and if they decide that the benefits are greater than the costs, the probability that they will engage in a corrupt act increases and *vice versa*.

Factors related to the Corrupt Act

There are basically two kinds of bribery. “Speed payments” are bribes that expedite a decision or process without altering it. “Distortive payments” are bribes that change the decision and contravene laws, rules and regulations¹². For example, bribing a clerk to issue a driver’s license or a passport quickly. is a speed payment (also called “oiling the wheels”), whereas bribing him to issue a license or passport to someone who is not legally entitled to it involves a distortive payment. In the former case the briber buys “priority” in obtaining a service, whereas in the latter the briber secures a decision or a service to which he is not entitled.

It can be argued that speed payments generally occur at lower administrative levels, while distortive payments occur at middle or higher levels¹³. It can be expected that the “price” of distortive payments would be higher than speed payments, since

¹²Scott, James C. *Comparative Political Corruption*, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1972: 67.

¹³Ibid.

the “risk” involved in altering a formally established decision is greater than in simply expediting it. Furthermore, the “price” of speed payments is more likely to have a fixed or standard rate since the risk involved and the cost and benefits for the parties are fairly clear and limited. On the other hand, since the price of distortive bribery depends on the extent of distortion and hence risk involved and on the advantage or privilege acquired by the briber, it differs in each case. Finally the price of bribery is affected by the “supply” of authoritative decision positions in the organization *vis-a-vis* the “demand” and “demand-intensity” of those seeking favorable decisions.

In other words if the number of people in positions empowered to take a particular decision is limited, and the number of clients demanding it are many, then the price of bribery will be higher. Furthermore, if only one client can benefit from the corrupt act (as in the case of obtaining a sales contract), the demand-intensity for a favorable decision would be higher and hence the price of bribery. On the other hand, if for a particular decision or process several or alternative decision positions are available, and the number and demand-intensity of those seeking a favorable decision are limited, then the price of bribery will be relatively lower.

The number of officials, whose cooperation has to be secured for the corrupt act to be realized, also affects the price and probability of bribery. As the number increases, the price of bribery also increases. But at the same time, since bringing together a number of collaborators is relatively more difficult and risky (because “secrecy”, the primary concern for both the briber and the bribed, becomes more difficult to maintain) the probability of bribery will decrease. Conversely, the fewer the collaborators, the higher the probability of bribery, other things being equal.

Considering the above, the factors involved in the corrupt act which affect the price and probability of bribery are the following:

- a) The nature of the decision or process (expediting or distorting) in question
- b) The demand for the corrupt act
- c) The number of clients that can benefit from the corrupt act (demand intensity)
- d) The supply of decision-making positions
- e) The number of collaborators needing to be brought together in order for the corrupt act to be realized
- f) The nature and extent of benefit and risks for the official and briber.

Factors related to the Organization

The Nature of the Functions of the Organization

When due to the nature of the functions or tasks of the public organization its decisions gain economic value or create economic opportunities, the potential for bribery emerges.

Especially in the developing countries, for example, import restriction policies have led to a web of complex (and even at times conflicting) customs rules, regulations and formalities. Furthermore, concern with the consequences of inflation has induced some governments to introduce statutory price controls¹⁴. These policies, measures and controls have inevitably increased both the decision-making powers of the official and the economic value of his decision. Similarly, as a result of rapid urbanization, the awarding of rights of usage of the limited urban area has taken on economic value, and in fact municipal authorities have, on occasion, been accused of bribery in this regard.

Therefore it can be argued that public organizations whose tasks involve decisions of economic value possess a greater potential for corruption and bribery than other public organizations.

Authority Structure, Decision Formation and Extent of Specialization

If the organization's authority structure is relatively centralized, decisions and controls are made at the higher levels in the hierarchy. In this case, bribery will be likely to take place at these levels and its price will be relatively higher since the "supply" of authority is little compared to organizations with less centralization.

Closely related to the above is the decision formation policy of the organization in question. Processes and decisions which are programmed do not leave room for discretion or judgment and therefore bureaucratic control of the process and the official or of the decision becomes relatively easy. This increases the risk and hence the cost of corruption and therefore reduces the possibility of corruption. On the other hand unprogrammed or unprogrammable decisions mean the existence of alternative courses of action for the decision-maker, *i.e.*, the public official can exercise judgment and discretion which cannot be easily and readily subjected to

¹⁴ Killick, Tony. "Price Controls in Africa: The Ghanaian Case." *Journal of Modern African Studies* 11 (September, 1973): 405–426.

bureaucratic control. Therefore unprogrammed decisions carry greater potential for corruption than programmed decisions.

In this context, the nature and the extent of (professional) expertise in the organization, become important. Specialization, expertise and professional knowledge and skills bring not only authority but also power to the holder. In public organizations with a developed system of specialization and staffed with experts and professionals, administrative and political control (control by politicians or citizens) of the decision-maker is relatively weak. In other words, expertise and professionalization widen the scope of judgment and discretion of the decision-maker, and the potential for corruption increases as in the examples of construction project controllers, tax officials and doctors. Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that the existence of a high level of expertise (e.g. universities, libraries, hospitals) does not necessarily increase the potential for corruption. The decision in question must be of value to the other party for bribery to take place.

In sum, the authority structure (centralization–decentralization), the decision formation (programmed–unprogrammed) and the extent of expertise (high–low) of the organization in question affect the nature and the probability of bribery.

The Image of the Organization

The existence of “uncovered” cases of corruption or bribery in an organization serves to discourage potential bribe-takers since exposure proves that they can be caught. In this sense, it can be argued that the existence of exposure may lessen the probability of bribery. However, although cases of bribery are constantly being exposed, it continues to occur in dealings with building contractors, the police and customs officials to mention a few. It is likely that such exposure is instructive, so to speak, to would-be bribers and bribe-takers who develop more innovative ways and forms of bribery such as using a middle man or accepting valuables which cannot be easily traced.

The image of the organization or the agency is important, since clients, whether individuals or firms, may be more inclined to bribe public officials if they think that the organization is corrupt and bribery is a sure way to have things done. Such an inclination may induce the weak official to accept and in time perhaps to ask for bribes. If the negative image is an undeserved one, then the administrators may be sensitive to the issue and in an attempt to eradicate it require that everything be done “by the book”. This will likely slow things down leading clients to the conclusion that bribery is needed to have things move. It can be argued that a negative image of

the organization, whether merited or not, may increase the probability of bribery¹⁵.

The Norms and the Culture of the Organization

The norms and the culture of the organization, together with other organizational factors examined so far, influence the way the members or the employees of the organization perceive and calculate costs and benefits and the risk of being caught. The actual norms of the organization may differ from formal bureaucratic norms. There can be organizations where bribery is common and even systematic. In such cases organizational goals, tasks, and the notion of public service lose their validity and the organization becomes a means of supplying illegal benefits to its collaborating members. Middle and higher level administrators who are the main beneficiaries allow or tolerate bribe-taking at lower levels to reduce the possibility of complaints or tip-offs on their own misleading. Here an organized system of bribery exists with larger sums involved at higher levels and smaller sums frequently exchanged at lower levels.

A typical example of organized or systematic bribery is that given regularly by the “underground” or the mafia to the police to overlook illegal activities such as gambling, prostitution and drug traffic¹⁶. The amount of the payment or the “salary” is determined according to the hierarchical position of the official.

In sum, to the extent that the actual norms and the culture of the organization do not form a hostile or intolerant environment towards bribery, the probability of its occurrence will be higher.

Factors related to the Environment

In this study public bureaucracies have been regarded as systems carrying a potential for bribery. From this point of view, the probability of bribery exists wherever there are public organizations. However, the specific nature and the probability of bribery depend on the persons involved, the corrupt act in question, the organization in which the event takes place and finally the social, economic, political and cultural environment within which the organization operates. In this section factors related to the environmental setting will be examined.

¹⁵See, for example, Myrdal, Gunnar. *Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations* (Volume II), Random House, New York, 1968: 954–955.

¹⁶Gardiner, James A. *The Politics of Corruption: Organized Crime in an American City*, Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1970.

The Nature and the Rate of Societal Change

There seems to exist a relationship between the rate of change of the social system and corruption¹⁷. The norms of the society determine what is good and bad, acceptable and unacceptable, and proper and improper at a certain time period. Norms take specific forms like custom, morals and law, and these are affected by technological developments and sociopolitical struggles and power disputes. As a result, in time norms undergo certain changes and new norms come into being. However, there generally is a time lag between old and new norms. Depending on the time lag and the degree of difference between the old and the new, norms lose their certainty and validity to some extent during the social transformation. As norms become blurred, tolerance limits for deviance widen. Such an environment provides a relatively more suitable setting for corruption and bribery which are, in a sense, forms of deviant behavior. Hence it can be argued that a relationship exists between the rate of societal change and the probability of corruption and bribery. Some scholars explain the more frequent occurrence of bribery in the less developed countries, compared to developed countries, by the rate of change¹⁸. It is also pointed out that the developed countries had similar transformations and experiences in the 19th and early 20th centuries, during which values, norms and concepts related to the state, the citizen and the public office were reshaped. During this process new norms emerged but inevitably there was a time lag during which corruption and bribery did not encounter social or political resistance. As norms later settled and diffused throughout the sociopolitical system, misuse of public office became a part of deviant behavior¹⁹. Within this framework, it can be suggested that rapid societal change provides a more fertile soil for corruption and hence increases the probability of bribery.

¹⁷Huntington, Samuel P. *Political Order in Changing Societies*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1968: 59–71.

¹⁸See, for example, Abueva, Jose V. “The Contribution of Nepotism, Spoils, and Graft to Political Development.” in Heidenheimer, Arnold J. *Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis*, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York 1970: 534–539.

¹⁹Greenstone, David. “Corruption and Self-interest in Kampala and Nairobi: A Comment on Local Politics in East Africa.” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 8 (January 1968): 199–210. Wraith, Ronald and Simpkins, Edward. *Corruption in Developing Countries*, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1963: 33.

Concurrence Between Social and Bureaucratic Norms

Another important dimension and implication of societal change and the emergence of new norms is the possible variance between social norms and bureaucratic (legal) norms. The substance of these unwritten and written norms may have striking differences. Although laws generally have their roots in social norms, still some laws may be “imported” and “alien”. In such cases, “state” and ‘society” can have different codes and usually the state’s regulations lose their validity and are rarely, if ever enforced. For instance, in a society where giving gifts and small bribes to officials is not contrary to cultural norms, legal and bureaucratic norms and rules may not be effective. This is valid for quite a few developing countries where structures are modern, but social values and behavior patterns are still mostly traditional²⁰.

In the above context it may be proposed that the extent of harmony between social and state laws and norms affects the probability of corruption and bribery. If the two sets of norms support each other, then legal norms will be more likely to be observed. And since this will increase the risk and cost of bribery the probability of its occurrence will decrease.

Socialist vs. Capitalist Systems

As mentioned frequently throughout the article, the potential for bribery exists where there is bureaucracy. In this regard public bureaucracies in both capitalist and socialist countries are subject to bribery. Yet, the nature of bribery — its form, amount and magnitude—is different in the two systems. Although the decisions and functions of bureaucracy in socialist systems are relatively comprehensive, they do not create sizable economic opportunities and advantages. For this reason, bribery is more often seen in service-related areas such as obtaining priority in housing, or apartments with more rooms or closer to the workplace, or better treatment in hospitals²¹. Although the amount of the bribe will depend on the illegal privilege provided, it can be guessed that the limited welfare of the citizens naturally limits this amount.

In the developed capitalist economies, on the other hand, bureaucracys’ decisions may create certain economic opportunities. However, the private sector is

²⁰Van Roy, Edward. “On the Theory of Corruption.” *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 19 (October 1970):86–110.

²¹Kramer, John M. “Political Corruption in the U.S.S.R.” *Western Political Quarterly* 30 (June 1977): 213–224. Schwartz, Charles A. “Corruption and Political Development in the U.S.S.R.” *Comparative Politics* 11 (July 1979): 425–443.

usually organized and conveys its interest to the political system in a systematic manner. For instance, influence is exerted on the legislative process through lobbying which is a legitimate form of influence and pressure. Here interest satisfaction takes place in the political arena and potential pressures on the bureaucracy are reduced. In the meantime, interest groups, citizens and the press exert considerable and continuous pressure on the bureaucracy and the bureaucrat for rational performance and fair treatment. All these reduce the probability of bribery and corruption. Yet, in cases involving sizable economic advantages bribery can still be seen, taking place at the higher bureaucratic echelons and involving large amounts.

On the other hand, in the developing countries, lobbying is generally ineffective, and businessmen and interest groups have difficulty in influencing the legislative process, and instead try to exert influence at the administrative stage²². Thus, pressures for interest satisfaction shift from the political to the bureaucratic sphere, and the probability of bribery in the bureaucracy increases. For instance, Scott compares interest-satisfaction attempts of the Thai and Japanese business elites, and notes that the former try to influence bureaucratic elite through bribes, whereas the latter try to influence the dominant political party by lobbying and contributing to its campaign funds²³.

In general, bribery is less frequent in developed capitalist and socialist systems compared to underdeveloped countries²⁴. It can be argued that in societal systems where respective power positions and status of the public and private sectors in the state, society and economics and their interrelationships are well-defined, rooted, and, in a sense, institutionalized, the probability of bribery is relatively lower, other things being equal²⁵.

²²See, for example, Dwivedi, O.P. "Bureaucratic Corruption in Developing Countries." *Asian Survey* 7 (April 1967): 245–254.

²³Scott, *op. cit.*, 22–23.

²⁴Myrdal, *op. cit.*

²⁵After studying the Egyptian and Moroccan cases, Waterbury concludes that a "parasitic symbiosis develops between the public and private sectors". "Contracts can be, and frequently are awarded on a non-competitive basis with kickbacks, side-deals ... The important point is that the private sector comes to depend upon the vast flow of publicly-disbursed funds for its survival, while public sector officials jockey for positions where they can control, and benefit from, the disbursement of these funds". Waterbury, *op. cit.* For similar observations on the African, Indian, Middle Eastern, Ghanaian, and Thai cases see, respectively, Leys, Colin. "What is the Problem About Corruption?" *Journal of Modern African Studies* 3 (August 1965): 215–224. Monteiro, John B. *Corruption: Control of Maladministration*, Manaktala and Sons, Bombay, 1966. Jacoby, Neil H., Nehemkis, Peter and Eells, Richard. *Bribery and Extortion in World Business*, McMillan, New York, 1977. Price, Robert M. *Society and Bureaucracy in Contemporary Ghana*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1975. Scott, *Op. cit.*

Extrabureaucratic Control Mechanisms

The press and media, associations, trade unions, political parties, legislative and judicial organs check and control bureaucratic performance. In the absence of such effective control by extrabureaucratic institutions, the bureaucracy and bureaucrat may become overautonomous and irresponsible, and consequently self-preserving and power-seeking²⁶. In other words, without extrabureaucratic control to prevent the bureaucracy from seeking its own self-interest, officials may accept or extort bribes. To the extent that such controls and checks are present and effective, bribery becomes more risky, costly and likely to be exposed and as a result the probability of corruption decreases²⁷.

Conclusion

In this article it has been argued that public bureaucracies carry a potential for bribery. In this context factors affecting this potential or the probability of bribery have been identified, examined and some propositions have been formulated within a framework involving factors related to individuals, the corrupt act, the organization and the environment. These factors interact with each other and assume different weights or importance according to the temporal, spatial and societal contexts in question and as a result the probability, nature, frequency, extent and the price of bribery take their specific and concrete forms.

²⁶See, for example, Eisenstadt, S.N. "Bureaucracy and Political Development." in La Palombara, Joseph L. *Bureaucracy and Political Development*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1963. Riggs, Fred W. "Bureaucrats and Political Development: A Paradoxical View." in Palombara, *op. cit.* Weidner, Edward, W. *Technical Assistance in Public Administration Overseas: The Case for Development Administration*, Public Administration Service, Chicago, 1964.

²⁷For example the lack of effective extra-bureaucratic controls on Thai, Pakistani, and Ghanaian bureaucracies has been accounted for the existence and persistence of corruption and bribery in these bureaucracies. See, respectively, Riggs, Fred W. *Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Policy*, East-West Center Press, Honolulu, 1966. Goodnow, Henry F. *The Civil Service of Pakistan: Bureaucracy in a New Nation*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1964. Werlin, Herbert H. "The Roots of Corruption — the Ghanaian Enquiry." *Journal of Modern African Studies* 10 (June, 1972):247–266.